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ABSTRACT. Standard lore has it that a proper name, or a definite description on its de re read-
ing, is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks
out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant (a 3D object that persists
through time by being fully present at different times) then we know what this means, though
we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity
in question is a perdurant (a 4D worm that persists through time by having different parts at
different times) then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it is that
different speakers ever manage to pick out one and the same entity when a host of suitable,
overlapping candidates are available. But what if the entity in question is neither a continuant
nor a perdurant? What if the things we talk about in ordinary language are time-bound entities
that cannot truly be said to persist through time, or stage sequences whose unity resides exclu-
sively in our minds—like the “wave” at the stadium or the characters of a cartoon? In such
cases the rigidity claim can’t be right and a counterpart-theoretic semantics seems required. Is
that bad? I say it isn’t. And it had better not be, if that turns out to be the best metaphysical
option we have.
1. Introduction
A proper name, or a definite description on its de re reading, is most naturally
thought of as a rigid designator—as an expression that, in a speaker’s mouth,
picks out the same entity at every time and in every world in which it picks out
an entity at all. If the name ‘John Doe’ picks out the philosopher in front of me
now, then it is natural to think that, in our mouths, it will pick out that person
whenever we engage in tensed and modal talk.1 This thesis, which has been
famously and vigorously defended by Kripke2, is by now standard lore and I
do not wish to dispute its semantic plausibility. I do, however, share the con-
1 Henceforth I shall omit the qualification bearing on the speaker’s mouth, though it should
always be implicitly assumed: obviously a name could have different referents in different
worlds (someone else could have been baptized ‘John Doe’) and different speakers at different
times may use it differently.
2 See Kripke 1971.
2cerns of those philosophers who worry the about notion of sameness (or iden-
tity) that the thesis itself appears to presuppose. Intuitively, we have an idea of
what it is to pick out the same entity at different times or in different worlds. If
I say that John Doe arrived yesterday we all know what I mean, even though
the current referent of ‘John Doe’ might be slightly different from yester-
day’s—in fact, it is different, at least in terms of its material constitution. Ditto
for the modal case, where we look for the referent of that name in other possi-
ble worlds. Those who know John all have a rough idea of what John could be
or could have been like; for example, it is plausible to suppose that he could
have been a singer rather than a philosopher, but not that he could have been a
dog, or a table, or a prime number, or a tennis game. Such intuitions, however,
must be backed up by a theory. Perhaps we need no formal theory to under-
stand sameness beyond the triviality that each thing is itself and not another
thing. But we do need a stronger theory in order for the notion of a rigid des-
ignator to be fully cashed out. And a good theory of sameness calls for a the-
ory of the sort of entities about whose sameness the theory legislates.
On closer examination, for example, the informal intuitions that I have
just mentioned seem to carry a commitment to some form of essentialism.
John will or could be different from the way he actually is at present provided
the difference does not involve any change in those properties of his that are
somehow essential to his identity. So, if personhood is an essential property of
his, then John could be a singer but could not cease to be a person, hence he
could not be a dog, a table, etc. Kripke, for one, has been clear about this. His
views about modal rigidity come with a substantive metaphysical doctrine in-
volving the acceptance of a number of essentialist claims. And such a doctrine
is implicit in most theories that share Kripke’s account of modal and counter-
factual talk, insofar as this involves the presupposition that one and the same
object can be found in more than one world—i.e., that an object in a world w
can be numerically identical to (albeit qualitatively different from) an object in
another world, w'. Although formally we are free to set up any modal structure
we like, with no constraint whatsoever on the intension of our non-logical
predicates or on the accessibility relation that holds between a world and its
possible alternatives, in actual philosophical practice we have to be more re-
strictive. Otherwise virtually any statement of the form ‘Possibly p’ would
come out true, and ‘Necessarily p’ false, when p is atomic (except when p it-
self is an identity statement.) And how can we be restrictive without buying
into some form of essentialism? How can we rule out a possible world in
which John Doe is a table, if not by reference to the assumption that person-
hood and tablehood are metaphysically incompatible?
3Perhaps there is nothing wrong with essentialism per se. But it would be
unfortunate if a general thesis about the semantic behavior of proper names
turned out to be inextricably committed to such a metaphysics. On the other
hand, what are the alternatives? We may, of course, dispense with transworld
identity altogether and provide a different account of our modal and counter-
factual talk. David Lewis’s counterpart theory is such an account.3 On this
theory, when we counterfactualize about John Doe we actually speculate about
John’s other-wordly counterparts. This means that the statement ‘John Doe
could have been a singer’ would be true, not if there is a possible world in
which John is a singer, but if there is a counterpart of John’s, in some possible
world, who is a singer. This alternative account can do away with essentialism,
since counterparthood need not be given a strong metaphysical connotation.
But the account has its own costs. For one thing, many philosophers believe
that it doesn’t bite at the right level. As Kripke himself put it, John Doe may
speculate about whether— had he done such and such things—he would have
gotten tenure, and surely such a speculation is about John himself. Why should
he care about whether his counterparts got tenure in some other possible
world, if they are not he?4 In addition, and more to the point, counterpart th e-
ory appears to violate our initial intuition, according to which proper names
and de re descriptions are modally rigid. For, clearly, insofar as it dispenses
with transworld identity, counterpart theory implies that when we use such
terms we pick out different referents in different worlds. In this world the
name ‘John Doe’ picks out the person in front of me. In other worlds it does
not pick out that person but its counterparts. And the counterpart relation falls
short of identity.
There is in principle a third option besides accepting modal essentialism
and rejecting modal rigidity. One could just dispense with de re modal talk in
general, as Quine recommended.5 I actually don’t think that that is a feasible
option, at least within the conceptual framework of standard quantified modal
logic. (We know for a fact that no non-trivial system of quantified modal logic
can express every de re modality in terms of an equivalent de dicto modality.6)
But never mind that. It just seems to me that we cannot so easily do away with
temporal modalities. We may be Quinean with respect to the meaningfulness
of such modal statements as ‘John Doe could have been a singer’ or ‘John Doe
3 Lewis 1968.
4 See Kripke 1972, p. 45. As will be clear in Section 5, I don’t find this line of objection co m-
pelling, but for the moment I shall leave it unanswered.
5 See Quine 1953.
6 See Tichy 1973.
4could not have been a table’, but we do want to be able to say such things as
‘John Doe was singing’ or ‘John Doe will soon go back to Boston’. We may
be skeptical about the meaningfulness of statements of the form ‘x is P but it
could have been Q’, yet we do want to make sense of at least some statements
of the form ‘x is P but it was (or will be) Q’. And it’s hard to see how we can
make sense of such statements without taking de re temporal talk seriously.7
Indeed, it is remarkable that such worries have been raised mostly with
regard to modality. Our temporal talk is in a way much more basic; and al-
though our intuitions about identity across time are stronger and more en-
trenched than our intuitions about identity across worlds, both are problematic
and there is no way we can cash out semantic rigidity for free. This semantic
thesis calls for a substantive theory of diachronic sameness. And a substantive
theory of diachronic sameness calls for a theory of the sort of entities that can
be said to persist through time.
2. Semantic Rigidity and Temporal Persistence
Let us focus on time, then. Assuming that we cannot be deflationists about
such matters, what notion of diachronic sameness can we rely on to cash out
the temporal rigidity thesis? To cut a long story short, the options boil down to
three.8
The first option corresponds to Kripke’s modal intuitions, mutatis mu-
tandis, which in this regard are part and parcel of common sense. On this
view, the entities that we normally refer to when we use a proper name or a de
re definite description are entities that exist at more than one time—in fact
throughout a time interval—though their properties need not be constant. In
other words, such things as persons, rocks, and tables are three-dimensional
continuants that literally persist through time in spite of the many qualitative
changes that they may undergo. Call this the 3D view.
The second option is four-dimensionalism. On this view, ordinary ob-
jects such as persons, rocks, or tables are not continuants; they are perdurants.
They have spatial as well as temporal parts, or stages, and to say of such ob-
jects that they persist through time is to say that they have different parts that
7 In drawing a parallel between temporal and modal talk I do not mean to suggest the tenabi l-
ity of the analogy between tense and modal logic. Evans 1979 famously argued that the anal-
ogy is problematic, as treating truth-at-a-time in analogy with truth-at-a-world seems to yield
relativism about truth. I don’t think Evans’s case is compelling (see e.g. Parsons 2003), but in
any event it will soon be clear that I only take temporal talk to require an account of temporal
predication, and the latter need not be analyzed in terms of tense-logic operators.
8 References will be provided in the next sections.
5exist at different times. So on this view the person in front of me now is not
John Doe in his entirety. It is only a temporal part of John, just as I am not ex-
posed to his whole life but only to its current stage. (In this sense, ordinary
objects are not distinct from events, which also extend over time.) Let us call
this the 4D view.
It is clear that both of these options—the 3D view and the 4D view—can
provide a suitable metaphysical back up to the rigidity thesis: the 3D view for
reasons perfectly analogous to the modal case; the 4D view for the reason that
time is no different from space in this regard—there is no difference between
synchronic and diachronic identity. Just as the name ‘John Doe’ picks out
one and only one spatially extended entity even though John’s spatial parts
may be qualitatively different, it picks out one and only one temporally ex-
tended entity even though his temporal parts may be qualitatively different.
So both a 3D and a 4D account of persistence can provide a suitable back up
to the rigidity thesis. The question is whether such service comes at a good
price, both with regard to the metaphysical implications of those views and
with respect to their behavior vis-à-vis other semantic intuitions besides the
rigidity of proper singular terms. If the answer to this question is in the affir-
mative, then you choose the theory you like best. If, by contrast, the answer is
in the negative—if both views turn out to be excessively costly—then you
may want to consider a third option. This third option has come to be known
as the stage view, and may be regarded as the temporal analogue of counter-
part theory.
On the stage view, things such as persons, rocks, or tables do not truly
persist. They do not exist at different times (wholly or partially) just as they do
not exist at different worlds. On this view all objects are time-bound, just as
they are world-bound according to modal counterpart theory, and to speak of
them as persisting through time is to speak loosely. Strictly speaking, when
you say that the person who is now in front of you is the same entity as the
person who was in front of you a minute ago, you are saying something false.
What you should say is that the person who is now in front of you is the pre-
sent counterpart—the current representative, if you like—of the person who
was in front of you a minute ago. The relevant counterpart relation falls short
of identity, as in the modal case. But of course this is not to deny that we often
speak as though the two relations coincided. We speak of the “wave” at the
stadium as something that moves around, even though strictly speaking there
is only a sequence of different groups of people who jump up and down at
successive times and places. We speak of the characters in a cartoon as of en-
tities that survive all sorts of adventures, even though strictly speaking there is
6nothing but a sequence of different drawings suitably related to one another.
Likewise, on the stage view we ordinarily speak of persons and other objects
as of entities that persist through time even though strictly speaking there is
nothing but processions of time-bound entities following one another. And if
things are so, then there is no need to worry about the sorts of metaphysical
complications that come with the thought that a thing can preserve its numeri-
cal identity while undergoing qualitative changes. On this view, there is no
identity through time. All the burden is placed on the counterpart relation, and
this need not be metaphysically loaded, just as it is not metaphysically loaded
in the modal case.
Of course, precisely as in the modal case, this also means that the stage
view does not sit well with the intuition that names and de re descriptions are
rigid designators. Not only that. It also involves a drastic, radical departure
from common sense, for the intuition that persons, tables, and many other
things indeed are such as to persist through time is deeply entrenched in our
pre-analytical conception of the world. So the theory has its obvious costs. But
that’s precisely the question I want to focus on. The stage view is admittedly
revisionary. The question is whether the costs involved in such revisions ex-
ceed the benefits that they deliver.
3. The Costs of Three-dimensionalism
I do, in fact, think that the stage view is not as odd as it might seem, and that
all things considered it may fare better than its competitors. By means of mo-
tivation, let me first review the main reasons why I think we should not just go
ahead and buy into the standard 3D view, or into its 4D alternative. These rea-
sons might leave some unmoved. Others might think that there are excellent
ways of dealing with the underlying problems. Nonetheless it seems to me that
such reasons must be brought into the picture in order to get clearer about the
options.
Let’s start with the 3D view. After all, this is the view that comes with
common sense and there is an outstanding philosophical tradition, dating back
to Aristotle,9 devoted to articulating it in detail. To repeat: it is the view a c-
cording to which ordinary objects are continuants—entities that persist
through time by being fully present at different times, though some of their
properties may change. (Some would restrict the view to natural entities like
9 Metaphysics XII, 1069b. To be precise, the view goes back to Aristotle insofar as the entities
in question are construed as substances (which may be denied in the case of artifacts such as
tables).
7persons and rocks, leaving out tables and other artifacts; others would restrict
it exclusively to persons and other living organisms, treating inanimate entities
such as rocks on a par with tables. I shall ignore such distinctions here.10)
On my reckoning, the main problem with this view lies precisely in its
essentialist commitments. Just as in the modal case on a Kripkean account, the
only way a three-dimensionalist can explain why a given object x can survive
a change with respect to a certain property, P1, but not with respect to a differ-
ent property, P2, is by making a claim to the effect that P2, unlike P1, is an es-
sential property of x. And I side with those philosophers who find this sort of
distinction problematic.11 Besides, the explanation as such is plainly unsati s-
factory, for it doesn’t explain much. An essential property of x is, after all, one
that x cannot afford to lose. So to say that x cannot survive the loss of P be-
cause P is essential to x is to go in a circle.
Perhaps one could try to stay away from the sands of metaphysical es-
sentialism by speaking of concepts or predicates rather than properties. The
claim that a continuant x can survive a change with respect to P1 but not with
respect to P2 could be construed as a claim to the effect that our conception of
x includes its being P2 but not its being P1. But this is no cheap way out. For if
the persistence conditions of a continuant are determined by our conception of
it, then everything is up for grabs and one can hardly defend the 3D view by
appeal to its adherence to common sense. After all, common sense has it that
John’s conditions of survival do not depend at all on what we think he is—or
else John is not doing much work here.
In any event, these are not my only sources of concern with the 3D view.
There are many other problems with this view besides its apparent commit-
ment to essentialism. One is that it also involves a commitment to metaphysi-
cal vagueness, which I find independently problematic.12 Take your object, x,
and imagine a situation in which it undergoes a process of mereological de-
composition: one by one, the n molecules constituting x are taken apart so that
after n steps we are left with a bunch of widely scattered molecules. I don’t
know many people who are willing to bite the bullet and say that x does not
survive the first step of the process, or that it survives every step of the proc-
ess, for everything can be decomposed by a soritical process of this sort. So, if
10 The list of philosophers who endorse the 3D view in some form or other is endless. Promi-
nent recent entries include Strawson 1959, Wiggins 1980, van Inwagen 1990a, and Lowe
1999, but I will not attempt any detailed examination of their specific formulations.
11 For a map of the issues see e.g. French et al. 1986.
12 The argument from vagueness can be found in Noonan 1982 and Heller 1990, ch. 3. See
also Sider 1997, § 3.3, and Le Poidevin 2000.
8you are a three-dimensionalist, then you are stuck with the following two op-
tions. First, you can say that x survives up to a certain point in the process,
after which x ceases to exist. This option, however, strikes me as absurd, un-
less we think that the problem of specifying the relevant cut-off point is purely
epistemic. In some cases this may well be a reasonable thing to say, modulo
our earlier concerns about essentialism. (For example, it may be reasonable
when x is a living being, say John Doe, biology being the science that can tell
us where the cut-off point lies.) But as a general account of what goes on with
processes of this sort, where x can be an inanimate entity such as a rock, or an
artifact such as a table, the epistemic explanation is itself a hard bullet to
bite.13 The second option is to say that x fades away gradually as it  undergoes
the process. This is really the only reasonable option. But to say that the x
fades away gradually is to say that the existence of x is a vague matter—that
there are times at which there is no determinate fact of the matter as to whether
x exists, hence no determinate fact of the matter as to what there is. And this is
the sort of metaphysical vagueness that I find utterly unpalatable.14
Of the other problems with the 3D view that I find compelling, I will
mention only two, and only very briefly. One relates to the so-called problem
of temporary intrinsics.15 For a three-dimensionalist, in a statement of the form
‘John Doe at noon is sitting’ the temporal modifier ‘at noon’ cannot be ana-
lyzed as an adjective attaching to the name ‘John Doe’, for otherwise Leib-
niz’s law would immediately imply that John Doe at noon is numerically dis-
tinct from John Doe at midnight (who was not sitting). More generally, in a
statement of the form
(1) x at t is P
the temporal modifier ‘at t’ cannot be analyzed as an adjectival modifier of the
subject term, ‘x’. It must be an adverbial modifier acting either on the whole
atomic statement ‘x is P’, or on the copula ‘is’, or on the predicate ‘P’, or else
we must reinterpret ‘P’ as a relational predicate linking an object to a time.
There is an extensive literature on these options, so you pick your favorite.16
Personally I think that the only reasonable choice is the second, according to
which it is the copula that gets modified by the temporal parameter. (The other
13 The view has its defenders, though, most notably Sorensen 1988 and Williamson 1994.
14 Some may be happy to pay the price, of course. See e.g. van Inwagen 1990a.
15 The label comes from Lewis 1986, p. 202.
16 To illustrate, the first option is defended by Forbes 1987, the second by Merricks 1994, the
third by Johnston 1987, and the fourth by Mellor 1981. (For a more detailed taxonomy, see
Bottani 2003.) Note that only the first of these options gives rise to the sort of worry men-
tioned in n. 7 above.
9three options yield a host of complications.17) But even this way of dealing
with the problem leaves me unhappy. As Lewis has recently argued, it is one
thing to have a property, it is something else to bear a certain relation—the
relation of having at—to it. “If a relation stands between you and your proper-
ties, you are alienated from them”.18 One could protest that the copula i t-
self—the unmodified having—is itself relational, so that the objection would
prove too much to deserve belief. But this cannot be right, for otherwise we
run into Bradley’s famous regress argument.19 It is precisely to avoid the r e-
gress that a realist about properties must cash out predication in terms of a so-
called “non-relational tie” between the object and the property being predi-
cated.20 Whatever that means, it must mean that the unmodified having—the
copula simpliciter—is not relational. And this is enough for Lewis’s objection
to deserve attention.
The last problem that I wish to mention briefly has something to do with
materialism. Take the case of Tibbles, the cat.21 At time t1 Tibbles is a regular
cat, with a nice tail. (Let us bar the previous objection and assume we know
how to provide a 3D semantics for a statement of this form.) At some point
there is an accident and at time t2 Tibbles is a tailless cat. Let ‘Tib’ designate
that entity that amounts to the proper part of Tibbles minus its tail at t1. Surely
at t1 Tib and Tibbles are distinct. But at t2 they coincide—they occupy exactly
the same region of space and they are made up of exactly the same stuff. Since
identity is a transitive relation, it must follow that the coincidence of Tib and
Tibbles at t2 falls short of identity. Really there are two things there, not one.
And this I find absurd. One may want to resist this conclusion by denying the
assumption that Tib exists at t1 (only Tibbles exists before the accident), or
one may want to resist it by denying that Tib exists at t2 (only Tibbles survives
the accident). Both of these options strike me as utterly implausible,22 so I
think one had better accept the conclusion and try to make sense of the thought
that two distinct continuants (indeed infinitely many continuants, by an obvi-
ous line of reasoning) can occupy exactly the same region of space and, for
some period of time, be made up of exactly the same stuff. This is a tough line
to take if you are a materialist, and I think I have good reasons for being one.
17 I try to spell out such complications in Varzi 2003b.
18 See Lewis 2002. The quote is from p. 5.
19 See Bradley 1893, Book 1, ch. 2
20 See Strawson 1959, p. 167.
21 The puzzle has been introduced to contemporary philosophical discussion by Wiggins 1968,
though versions of it go back at least to the Stoics (see Sedley 1982). For a sample of the lit-
erature on the topic, see Rea 1997.
22 Though they have been defended: see e.g. van Inwagen 1981 and Burke 1996, respectively.
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Anyway, perhaps some of these concerns can be taken care of within a
3D-theoretic framework; I am happy to concede that. But when the problems
pile up like this, I think it’s a good thing to start looking for alternative theo-
ries even if—or perhaps just because—you want to stay as close as possible to
common sense. (Incidentally, the 3D view does not sit well with the scientific
image of the world, either, particularly with relativity theory: if the notion of
simultaneity is relative to a frame of reference, then it makes no sense to say
of an object tout court that it is entirely present at every time at which it ex-
ists.23)
Let me just mention one variant of the 3D view that works a bit bet-
ter than what I have suggested. It is a variant often associated with the work
of Roderick Chisholm, though it really goes back to the Logique de Port-Royal
and, independently, to such philosophers as Hume, Butler, and Reid.24 On this
view, the world is made up of 3D entities, except that these are not the ones
we normally think of. The 3D entities in question are either metaphysical sim-
ples or mereological aggregates of simples. Consider this table. If it were
mereologically constant, then it would be such an entity. But because its
mereological composition does change through time (I have just cleaned the
surface and, by doing so, I inadvertently scraped away some of its molecules),
on this view the table does not belong to the furniture of the world. We can say
that the table survives such changes in a loose manner of speaking, but strictly
speaking we should say that different entities—different mereological aggre-
gates at different times—do duty for it. Different entities at different times do
duty for our table just as different players at different times do duty for our
favorite soccer team. And when we say that the table that was here yesterday
is the same as the table that is here today, or that the team we applauded last
year is the same as the team we are booing this year, what we mean—on this
view—is that something is still doing duty for a table or for a team with such
and such properties.
Chisholm used the scholastic term entia successiva to designate this sort
of sequences of mereological aggregates. And surely enough, if we go all the
way and say that everything is either a mereologically constant aggregate or a
sequence thereof (so: not only tables and soccer teams but also rocks, people,
and other living organisms), then many of the problems that I have outlined
with respect to the basic 3D view dissolve. We need not worry about essen-
23 On this see Balashov 2000.
24 See especially Chisholm 1976. For the precursors, cp. Arnauld and Nicole’s Logique ou
l’art de penser (2-xii), Hume Treatise (i.iv.6), Butler’s The Analogy of Reason (first appen-
dix), and Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (III.iii.ii).
11
tialism, unless we want to impose restrictions on the sort of properties that a
mereological aggregate can enjoy. We need not worry about metaphysical
vagueness, for we can always say that the vagueness applies to the concepts
and predicates that we use to pick out the entia successiva that are most salient
to our daily lives. We need not worry about Tibbles, for there is nothing wrong
in saying that the aggregate doing duty for Tibbles before the accident is big-
ger than the aggregate doing duty for Tib, whereas after the accident we take
one and the same aggregate to do duty for both. (The bigger aggregate sur-
vives as a scattered entity if the tail was neatly chopped off, or it no longer
exists if the tail or parts thereof have been annihilated.) So, as long as we say
that everything is either a mereologically constant aggregate or a (cognitively
salient) sequence thereof, we can dispose of a number of puzzles that seem to
affect the standard 3D view. We would still have the problem of temporary
intrinsics, though, as that problem does not depend on what entities we take to
be 3D continuants but only on the fact that we take some entities to be such.
And, perhaps more significantly, we would have to go back to our starting
point and reconsider the semantic thesis that names are rigid designators after
all. If they were, they would pick out mereologically constant aggregates of
simples (whatever we take these to be), and that would have disastrous conse-
quences. For example, the name ‘John Doe’ would now pick out an awfully
scattered collection of simples some of which you may still find in John’s
home town while others are probably in Boston and yet others are by now all
over the place. That is just not how semantic rigidity is supposed to work. So
if one reason to try to save the 3D view is to do justice to semantic rigidity, the
theory of entia successiva is hardly a viable option.
4. Four-dimensionalism
Some philosophers take all this to provide evidence in favor of the 4D view.
To repeat, on this view persisting objects are not continuants but perdurants.
Whereas on the 3D view an object persists by sweeping through time, on the
4D view an object persists by extending over time. Whereas on the 3D view an
object is entirely present at every time at which it exists, on the 4D view an
object is made up of successive temporal parts, just like an event (and for
some four-dimensionalists, such as Broad, Goodman, or Quine, there is no
significant difference between objects and events: an object is just a long, mo-
notonous event; an event is just an unstable object25). So, construed as a 4D
worm, an object can change along the temporal dimension in the same sense in
25 See Broad 1923, p. 393, Goodman 1951, p. 286, and Quine 1960, p. 171.
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which it can change along any of its spatial dimensions. We say of a river that
it is large here but not there insofar as this part of the river is large but that part
isn’t. Similarly, on the 4D view we say of an object x that it is P today but not
yesterday insofar as today’s temporal part of x is P but yesterday’s part isn’t.
This view was once quite unpopular except among scientifically-minded phi-
losophers, to the point of being sneered at as a “metaphysical quagmire” or a
“crazy metaphysics”.26 Today it is getting much more credit, precisely as a r e-
action to the difficulties that face the rival 3D view.
Indeed, the four-dimensionalist conception of the world is basically im-
mune from those difficulties. At least this is so if the conception is taken to
include the Quinean assumption that there is one (and only one) entity, how-
ever heterogeneous, for any matter-filled region of space-time, however dis-
connected and gerrymandered—an assumption that virtually all 4D theorists
make.27 For if we make this assumption, then the metaphysical puzzles that
afflict the 3D theory can be reconstrued as pertaining exclusively to the do-
main of semantics and cognition at large. Take essentialism. Will John Doe
become a table? It depends on which 4D worm you identify with John. Pre-
sumably he is the sort of worm every temporal part of which falls within the
extension of the predicate ‘person’. And presumably the extension of this
predicate, as determined by our linguistic practices, is disjoint from the exten-
sion of the predicate ‘table’. So John’s worm may very well be followed by a
table worm, but because John doesn’t extend that far we can safely say that he
will not turn into a table. This is not to say that personhood is an essential
property of his—just as the ordinary claim that the Ticino river does not ex-
tend as widely as to include the city of Pavia carries no commitment to the
view that riverhood is an essential property of Ticino. It is just a claim that
may help clarify the spatial boundaries of the referent of ‘Ticino’ as we nor-
mally use this name.
For the same reason, vagueness need not have ontological implications
on the 4D view. When a table undergoes a process that results into its com-
plete decomposition, we are confronted with a picture that involves a large
number of mereologically nested 4D worms: a worm all temporal parts of
which comprise exactly n molecules, a longer worm whose later temporal
parts comprise n–1 molecules, a longer worm whose later temporal parts com-
prise n–2 molecules, and so on. Which of these worms we intend to pick out
when we speak of the table may be indeterminate, and therefore there may be
26 See Hacker 1982, p. 4, and Thomson 1983, p. 210.
27 See e.g. Quine 1960, cit., Heller 1990, pp. 49f, Hudson 2001, pp. 105ff, Sider 2001, pp.
121ff.
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vagueness. But each such worm has precise spatial and temporal boundaries
and therefore the vagueness in question can be treated as a purely semantic
phenomenon. Ditto for the puzzle of Tibbles. There may be some indetermi-
nacy as to which 4D worm we mean to pick out when we use the name ‘Tib-
bles’, and also when we use the name ‘Tib’ to pick out its tailless proper part.
But the picture is clear enough. The earlier temporal parts of Tibbles are spa-
tially larger than the corresponding temporal parts of Tib. Their later parts,
those that follow the accident in which the tail gets detached, are identical. So
Tib is properly included in Tibbles, just as Tic—that portion of Ticino that
does not contain any Piedmontese bits—is a proper spatial part of Ticino. At
t2, after the accident, the thing meowing in front of us is a proper temporal part
of both Tib and Tibbles just as in Vigevano, after the boundary of Piedmont,
the thing flowing in front of us is a proper spatial part of both Tic and Ticino.
In both cases it is just one part—one thing—not two.
As for the problem of temporary intrinsics, the four-dimensionalist has
an obvious account to offer. In a statement of the form ‘x at t is P’, the tempo-
ral modifier ‘at t’ can be given exactly the interpretation that a 3D theorist
cannot conceive—as an adjective attaching to the subject term. The noun
phrase ‘x at t’ picks out the t-part of x, and the truth conditions of a statement
of the form ‘x at t is P’ are just the truth conditions of any old atomic state-
ment in subject-predicate form: the statement is true (simpliciter) if and only if
the denotation of the subject term is in the extension of the predicate
term—i.e., if and only if the t-part of the denotation of ‘x’ is in the extension
of ‘P’ (where the copula ‘is’ is now understood tenselessly). It might be
thought that this account is too simplistic, as much depends on what sort of
predicate ‘P’ is. It may be all right to say that ‘John Doe at noon is sitting’ is
true if and only if the noon-part of John Doe is sitting. But what about ‘John
Doe at noon is thinking of Susan’, or ‘John Doe at noon remembers everything
that happened in the morning’? How can an instantaneous temporal part enjoy
properties that require time?28 The answer is that the 4D theorist need not a s-
sume that the different parts constituting a temporally extended entity are mu-
tually independent of one another. An instantaneous temporal part can satisfy
the properties in question by virtue of its having the right intrinsic properties
and standing in the right relational ties to other temporal parts and to its envi-
ronment. The worry would cut deep only if mental states and properties were
28 Actually the 4D view is not committed to the existence of instantaneous parts: the 4D world
could consist of temporally “atomless gunk”, in which case ‘John Doe at noon’ would have to
be interpreted as denoting an arbitrarily brief (rather than instantaneous) time slice of John.
Even so, the worry would still arise.
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fully intrinsic, but that assumption is a sign of a 3D bias: as Katherine Hawley
has put it, there is nothing inconsistent in the thought that John’s present stage
has certain memories, attitudes, and emotions partly because it is suitably re-
lated to other stages of John’s, just as there is nothing wrong in the thought
that the piece of wood in front of me has the property of being a table leg
partly because it is suitably related to other pieces of wood.29
So what’s wrong with this theory, if all the pieces fit together so nicely?
(As I said earlier, the theory also vindicates the rigidity thesis, albeit in a
somewhat trivial way.) I see two problems with it, apart from whatever other
problems one might have with what I have just said on its behalf. The first is
that the 4D theory owes us an account of how reference works; the second is
that the 4D account of predication illustrated above appears to yield awkward
results when combined with certain plausible assumptions concerning the se-
mantics of the quantifiers.
Let’s begin with reference. If the referents of proper names are tempo-
rally extended entities, how is it that different speakers ever manage to pick
out one and the same entity when a host of suitable, overlapping candidates
are available? I am not thinking here of the phenomenon of vagueness; as I
said, this phenomenon can be handled naturally on the 4D view, at least to the
extent that vagueness can be treated as a semantic phenomenon. I am thinking,
rather, of the sort of mechanisms that go into the process whereby a precise
designator gets attached to its referent. If the designator is a description, a
standard account can be given. But what if the designator is a proper name? I
point at this table and say: ‘Let’s call it George’. What exactly is this it that I
am picking out?
I see only two options. The first is to say that I am picking out a four-
dimensional table. If so, then I am establishing a tight link between the name
‘George’ and the sortal ‘table’. I am not just using this sortal to fix the refer-
ence; I’m building a lot more into it. By identifying George with a four-
dimensional table I am committing myself to the view that George is and will
always be a table. I will never be able to kick away that sortal and say, for ex-
ample, ‘George, which was a table, is now a bookshelf’. And this runs against
the view (often associated with the rigidity thesis, but independently moti-
vated) that names, unlike descriptions, do not impose any constraint on their
referents.
The second, more plausible option is to say that when I point at the table
and declare ‘Let’s call it George’, I am picking out an entity whose present
29 Hawley 2001, p. 65.
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temporal part is a table (or a temporal part of a table). Indeed, precisely be-
cause the 4D view treats space and time in the same fashion, it is natural to
think that this is how reference should work: just as you can touch the table’s
top and truthfully say ‘This is George’ even though you are only touching a
proper spatial part of George’s, on the 4D view you can touch the present
stage of George and say, truthfully, ‘This is George’ even though you are only
touching a proper (spatial and) temporal part thereof. However, this leaves us
in Quinean darkness. There are very many entities that include that temporal
part, very many four-dimensional worms that overlap at the relevant region of
space-time. Which one of them am I baptizing ‘George’? How far does
‘George’ extend? What are its temporal boundaries? There simply is no an-
swer to these questions on the 4D view. We may rely on a phase sortal in order
to pick out the referent of a name if the referent is in front of us in its entirety,
as the 3D theorists would have it (Kripke being one of them).30 But if all we
have in front of us is a proper temporal part of the intended referent, then it’s
hard to see how we can pick out such a referent. At least, it’s hard to see how
we can manage to communicate our baptismal intention to the other speakers
of our community. (One is reminded here of a familiar problem that we seem
to face in the case of events, understood as unrepeatable particulars that extend
through time. We seem to have no practical way of naming an event except
through a noun phrase derived by nominalization, and as a matter of fact we
usually do not have proper names for events.31)
I think this is a considerable problem for the 4D view, at least insofar as
we are interested in using this theory to back up semantic intuitions that are
independently motivated. But there is another problem.32 Recall that the 4D
view goes hand in hand with the assumption that the material content of any
region of space-time is an object, never mind whether we are inclined to speak
or think about it. Given this assumption —which a four-dimensionalist can
hardly discharge on pain of resuscitating 4D analogues of the problems af-
flicting the 3D view—we run into troubles as soon as we try to explain the
working of the quantifiers in ordinary language statements. If you say ‘John
Doe was a table’, what you say is false—or so we may suppose. Assuming we
30 I do not mean to say that the referent is physically present in its entirety; obviously that need
not be the case, e.g., if the referent is far away, or too big for us to see in its entirety (see
Kripke 1972, pp. 57–58). I mean to say that for the 3D theorists the referent is metaphysically
present in its entirety: we can identify it and give it a name with the help of a phase sortal be-
cause it is there for us to name it that way.
31 See Bennett 1988, p. 3. Hurricanes seem to be an exception, but then the sortal ‘hurricane’
is implicitly doing all the work.
32 The argument that follows is detailed in Varzi 2003a. See also Sattig 2003 for a follow-up.
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agree on the referent of ‘John Doe’, there is no past temporal part of John’s
that falls into the extension of the predicate ‘table’. If you say ‘Saul Kripke
was a table’, then again what you say is false—or so we may suppose. Pick
any philosopher you like, if you say that he or she was a table you say some-
thing false. So far so good. But what about the statement ‘Some philosopher
was a table’? Such a statement is true if and only if there is something that is at
present a philosopher but whose past temporal parts include at least one that is
a table. And sure enough, there are many such things. John Doe is not one of
them; but the mereological fusion of his recent temporal parts (including the
present one) and this table’s earlier parts is such a thing. It is a philosopher,
and it was a table.
Something is wrong here. And of course it is something serious, for the
problem metastasizes rapidly. If existential statements that are intuitively false
come out true because of some unheard-of table-philosophers, then universal
statements that are intuitively true will come out false—as with ‘Every phi-
losopher was a child’. Ditto for any other kind of numerical statement, such as
‘There are now n philosophers’ or ‘At most n philosophers can sing’. In fact,
every variable binder is going to behave wildly, including the definite de-
scriptor. If it turned out that Kripke was once transformed, for a short period
of time, into a table, then we might want to refer to him by the description ‘the
philosopher who was a table’ or ‘the table-philosopher’. Yet these descriptions
would certainly be inadequate, as Kripke would only be one table-philosopher
among very many others (defined along the lines illustrated above).
There are various ways out one can consider here, based on the intuition
that in cases such as these the predicate ‘philosopher’ is operating in more than
just a predicative role. After all, being a philosopher requires more than just
having a philosophical temporal part (just as it implies more than having a
philosophical spatial part—consider the present mereological fusion of John
Doe and this table). A philosopher must be a person, so the range of the quan-
tifiers in our examples should be restricted to persons. The trouble is that it is
hard to cash out this intuition. We could take the restriction to be a matter of
logical form, reading a statement of the form
(2) Some P was Q
(for example) as having the underlying form
(3) Some S that is P was Q.
But this would make the 4D view depend on the assumption that every predi-
cate comes with a suitable sortal S to filter out the undesired four-dimensional
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worms, and that assumption is unwarranted. Besides, there would be a diffi-
culty in identifying a ground level of analysis; for the problem would crop up
with the sortal predicates themselves (consider ‘Some person was a table’),
giving rise to an obvious regress. Alternatively, if we take the restriction to be
pragmatic, then we can hardly do justice to the existential import of ordinary
quantified statements. It is all right to appeal to context when it comes to the
semantics of names and predicates involving vagueness, ambiguity, or multi-
plicity of reference. It is all right to appeal to context also when it comes to
some quantificational phrases, as when we say ‘There is no beer’, meaning no
beer in the refrigerator. But it is odd that the logical business of variable
binding should always require a similar treatment, and as a matter of necessity.
And the oddness turns into embarrassment on account of the fact that quantifi-
cation is the only tool we have to give expression to our views on what there
is. Make that depend on context and everything is up for grabs again.
5. The Stage View
So much for my reasons for worrying about the notion of sameness that the
temporal rigidity thesis presupposes, at least insofar as that notion is construed
in terms of persistence through time by a continuant (the 3D view) or by a
perdurant (the 4D alternative). At this point I would like to turn to the re-
maining option, the stage view. I am not planning to articulate this view in
detail—not anymore than I have done with the other two views. I will simply
consider its positive features vis-à-vis the problems that I have just reviewed,
and then I will take a look at some prima facie unpalatable features of the the-
ory, features that one might be inclined to regard with strong suspicion. As it
turns out, I think such features can all be vindicated. And then I will draw my
moral.
To repeat, the stage view holds that things such as persons, rocks, or ta-
bles do not—strictly speaking—persist. They do not exist at different times
(wholly or partially) just as they do not exist at different worlds, and ordinary
talk to the effect that they do is to be construed as loose talk. On the stage
view, all objects of the garden variety are therefore like the “wave” at the sta-
dium or like the characters of a cartoon—sequences of different, time-bound
entities that follow one another in a cognitively salient way. So, in a way this
view wears its costs on its sleeves. Metaphysically, it requires a radical revi-
sion of our preanalytical beliefs about ourselves and about the world around
us. It requires that we give up on the very idea of diachronic identity and re-
place it with a weaker notion of temporal counterparthood, with all the corol-
laries that come with that. Semantically, it requires that we give up on the ri-
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gidity thesis as it is normally understood. For, surely, if the job of a proper
name is to pick out a certain entity, and if nothing exists at more than one
time, then a proper name cannot be used to pick out the same entity at differ-
ent times. The best we can say is that a proper name is a quasi-rigid designa-
tor, in that it allows us to pick out entities that are diachronically quasi-
identical, or genidentical—entities that are tied to one another by the counter-
part relation. Strictly speaking ‘John Doe’ denotes whatever stage was origi-
nally baptized that way, and if we use the name with reference to a different
time we pick out, not John Doe, but whatever counts as John Doe’s counter-
part at that time. The reference gets “upgraded” at each time, for we just can’t
afford using a different name for each stage.
Note that if we are liberal enough about mereological composition we
could make room for the mereological sums of all the stages, which would
give us a full fledged four-dimensional ontology. However, it would be incor-
rect to infer from this that the stage view is just a variant of four-dimen-
sionalism. The theories are different both semantically and metaphysically.
Semantically, they differ with respect to the basic mechanisms of reference: on
the 4D view an ordinary proper name picks out a 4D worm, not the stages that
constitute it. Metaphysically, they differ with respect to the basic features of
the world. The stage view is truly reductionist, in that all the work is done by
the time-bound stages; their temporally extended aggregates, if such there be,
add nothing. They are nothing over and above the stages, and their properties
reduce to the properties of their stages. On the 4D view, by contrast, there is
no commitment to such claims: there is no commitment to the primacy of the
stages over their aggregates and, as a matter of fact, there is no commitment at
all to the existence of instantaneous stages. The 4D world could consist of
temporally atomless gunk. (On the other hand, if the gunk hypothesis is re-
jected, then the 4D view is committed to providing an explanation of how in-
stantaneous things can make up a temporally extended sum, whereas the stage
theorist can remain neutral here.33)
Now, it is not difficult to see how the stage view is immune from the
many problems mentioned in the preceding sections. Essentialism and vague-
ness can be deflated away by placing the burden on the counterpart relation,
which in turn need not be built into the ontology but rather treated as a theo-
retical device.34 The problem of temporary intrinsics can equally be dealt with
33 On this see again Hawley 2001, esp. p. 52.
34 This means that on the stage view the phenomenon of vagueness affects the theoretical a p-
paratus, not just the semantics of our names as on the 4D view. See Varzi 2001 for an articu-
lation of this point, though with reference to the modal version of counterpart theory.
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easily by interpreting a statement of the form ‘x at t is P’ as meaning ‘The t-
counterpart of x is P’, which has a straightforward semantics if ‘x’ is under-
stood literally, i.e., as denoting the original bearer of this name. (If that entity
has no counterparts at t, or if it has more than one, then ‘the t-counterpart of x’
will fail to denote and our favorite theory of descriptions will tell us how to
handle it.35) And the Tibbles puzzle can be dismissed, too, insofar as it also
depends on taking persistence and rigid designation too strictly. Two things
cannot become one, but they may nonetheless have a single future counterpart:
the counterpart relation need not be one-to-one. So there is nothing paradoxi-
cal in saying that Tibbles and Tib are distinct at time t1, before the accident,
while their counterparts coincide at t2, after the accident.
36
As for the two problems that I mentioned in relation to the 4D view, they
do not affect the stage view either. Because names refer to instantaneous
stages, we can use a (phase) sortal to fix a referent, x, and then kick away the
sortal when we talk about x’s later stages. These stages need not be qualita-
tively identical to x, as they are not numerically identical, though all of them
will stand in a suitable counterpart relation to x. Indeed, we can build into this
relation all that is needed in order for the name to be used in a proper way, or
rather we can say that the counterpart relation itself is meant to reflect pre-
cisely the sorts of features that appear to underlie our use of proper names (as
described by the causal theory of reference, for instance), and in that sense the
stage view does not entail a commitment to descriptivism. Likewise, the stage-
theoretic account of quantified statements is straightforward. For example,
there is no reason to suppose that the statement ‘Some philosopher was a ta-
ble’ is true. For this statement says that among the present stages that qualify
as philosophers there is one whose earlier counterparts include a stage that
qualifies as a table, and there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that this is
the case.
So, on the face of it, the stage view is immune from the many problems
mentioned in the preceding sections with regard to the 3D and the 4D views. Is
this enough to outweigh the metaphysical and semantic costs of the stage
view? Really, I think the semantic cost of giving up rigidity in its customary
form is no big deal. Kripke’s original arguments for the rigidity thesis were
targeted against those semantic theories that fail to appreciate the difference
35 Note that the stage view is not committed to presentism: at the level of logical form, a
proper name denotes its original bearer whether or not that entity exists at the time of utter-
ance.
36 A detailed treatment of this puzzle may require positing multiple counterpart relations. See
Sider 2001, § 5.8, for this line of development.
20
between de re and de dicto patterns of reference, particularly between proper
names and definite descriptions. But these arguments still hold mutatis mutan-
dis as a defense of the thesis that names are quasi-rigid designators. Accep-
tance of this thesis is sufficient to distinguish the semantic behavior of a name
and that of a definite description in its de dicto reading; for the fact remains
that the referents of a description need not be counterpart-related, whereas the
referents of a proper name, or rather the referents of noun-phrases of the form
‘the t-counterpart of x’ where ‘x’ is a proper name, must be so related. Thus,
rigidity fails all right. But quasi-rigidity is as good as it can possibly be if the
ontology consists of stages, hence the cost may well be worth paying.
Of course, one may still wonder how this picture works in practice,
when it comes to explaining our actual linguistic endeavors. How exactly does
the ritual of baptism work on this view, given that any such ritual takes time?
And how exactly do we manage to pick out an instantaneous stage and say
something about it, given that relativity theory tells us that simultaneity is
frame relative? These are important questions, but I don’t think they are inher-
ently problematic. The second question, for instance, is bound to arise within a
3D or 4D framework, too. Suppose we say ‘John Doe is now sitting’. Regard-
less of what logical form we ascribe to this statement, there is a difficulty in
figuring out its truth-value since its utterance takes time (whereas ‘now’ refers
to a durationless instant, or to an arbitrarily short interval). My view is that the
best account is supervaluational: the statement is true (or false) if and only if it
is true (false) no matter how we interpret ‘now’; otherwise it is indeterminate.
But if a different account is favored, e.g., an epistemic account, I see no reason
why that should not be applicable to the stage-theoretic reading of the state-
ment if it is applicable to its competitors. Ditto for the frame relativity of si-
multaneity: suppose we pick a particular time instant t as the referent of ‘now’.
If there is no unique way of slicing up the space-time manifold, then there is
still indeterminacy as to what qualifies as the present temporal stage of John
Doe, since John Doe is also extended in space. On the supervaluational ac-
count that I favor this simply means that the truth-value of our statement, rela-
tive to t, is itself to be computed as the logical product of the statement’s truth-
values relative to each admissible frame of reference that passes through t, i.e.,
relative to each admissible way of construing John Doe’s stage at t. If this
truth-value does not change (as is often the case for ordinary statements) the
supervaluation will deliver that truth-value; otherwise the statement will be
semantically indeterminate.37 The first question—concerning the mechanics of
37 This account works equally for the stage view and the 4D view, where John Doe’s stage at t
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baptism—is indeed specific to the stage view. But a similar account can be
given also in this regard. Perhaps it is indeterminate exactly which stage was
baptized ‘John Doe’ when the name was first introduced. In that case, each
singular term of the form ‘the t-counterpart of John Doe’, as it occurs in the
logical form of the stage-theoretic reading of tensed statements, will inherit
some indeterminacy. Yet this indeterminacy is in most cases innocuous as our
statements will in most cases turn out to be true (or false) no matter how the
indeterminacy is resolved. As long as we are willing to live with widespread
indeterminacy—and we have already seen several independent reasons for
doing so—none of these semantic issues strikes me as problematic.
Really, then, I think it is the metaphysical cost of the stage view that is at
stake. So what exactly is this cost, apart from the fact that a stage-based ontol-
ogy runs against common sense? What is it that makes the stage view meta-
physically unpalatable, apart from the fact that it does not sit well with our
pre-analytical intuitions? I think the answer can be split into three parts. First,
there is the fact that the view seems to imply that the whole world and every-
thing in it keeps constantly coming into existence ex nihilo. This is particularly
striking when it comes to the constant coming into existence of things like us,
for after all we do seem to have evidence (such as our experience of a unity of
consciousness) to the effect that we are genuinely persisting things. Secondly,
there is the fact that the stage view requires an appeal to counterpart theory,
and one may have independent reasons for disliking that theory. Thirdly, there
is the fact that the ontological reductionism involved in the stage view requires
massive linguistic and epistemic revisionism. Let us see whether these three
features of the stage view justify skepticism.
6. Refinements
Concerning the first feature—to the effect that new things keep popping into
existence ex nihilo—it seems to me that its prima facie metaphysical extrava-
gancy depends on a three-dimensional bias on the part of common sense. If we
think of the world in terms of continuants—things that continue to exist—then
there seems to be something magical in the temporal procession of stages
postulated by the stage view. But put that bias on a side for a moment. Then
there appears to be something equally magical in the existential inertia postu-
lated by the 3D view. Why is it that continuants do not suddenly pop out of
is construed as his t-counterpart or as his t-part, respectively; I am not sure what to say on be-
half of the 3D theorist, for we have already seen that the frame relativity of simultaneity ap-
pears to affect the metaphysical intelligibility of that view, not just its semantics.
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existence? And how do they come into existence to begin with? With the pos-
sible exception of the version of three-dimensionalism that appeals to the the-
ory of entia successiva, the metaphysical mystery that comes with the concep-
tion of a world that is not always populated by the same entities is a source of
worry for the stage view and for the 3D view alike. If a 3D-theorists is allowed
to put the burden of the explanation on God’s inscrutable activity (as Des-
cartes famously did 38), then so is a stage-theorist. Alternatively, and more
plausibly, the 3D-theorist may appeal to some sort of causal story to explain
the mystery away. Every time a new continuant comes into or goes out of ex-
istence, it does so as a result of a causal impulse originated by some other,
prior continuant. But, again, if this appeal to causation is acceptable for the 3D
view, then it is also acceptable for the stage view.39 An instantaneous stage
need not be totally isolated from its temporal counterparts—from the stages
that precede or follow it. It can be caused to exist by previous stages and it can
be causally responsible for the existence of later stages. And this may well be
a case of immanent causation. Each instantaneous stage might contain in itself,
so to speak, the power to create the next, just as each 3D continuant may con-
tain in itself the power to survive. (If time is continuous, or at least dense, it
may be inaccurate to speak of the ‘next’ stage; but the stage-theorist need not
put it that way. Each stage may contain in itself the power to generate a whole
bunch of its successors, though to a degree that is inversely proportional to
their temporal distance.)
Nor is the appeal to causation a necessary feature of the stage view. I am
bringing it into the picture only for the purpose of highlighting this tu quoque
line of argument.40 I personally think that uncaused emergence ex nihilo is not
by itself metaphysically extravagant, so that the counterpart relation could be
left out of the picture in this regard. It may well be a brute fact that instantane-
ous things constantly come into and go out of existence just as it may be a
brute fact that continuants, too, sometime come into and go out of existence,
or that they extend through space. In fact, once the 3D bias is put aside, isn’t
there something magical also in the procession of spatial parts, which “begin”
and “cease” to exist as we move about in space?
In the case of entities such as persons the picture is admittedly more
complex, but then again the enormous literature devoted to the topic of per-
sonal identity shows that the 3D picture, too, is all but uncontroversial.
38 Cp. Meditations, III.
39 The causal account is defended e.g. in Heller 1990, §2.13, and Hawley 2001, §3.5. That it is
a matter of immanent (as opposed to transuent) causation is defended in Williams 2002.
40 The point is also made (and more thoroughly articulated) in Sider 2001, p. 217.
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Granted, the stage-theorist must be puzzled by the unity of consciousness, as
Kant already pointed out in his criticisms of Hume.41 Yet the puzzle is di s-
turbing only insofar as we assume that all stages as equally independent of
each other. That need not be the case. If a stage’s coming into existence is a
matter of causal powers, for instance, then the experiencing of a unity of con-
sciousness may be the result of powers of a peculiar sort—the causal powers
of those peculiar stages that go under the name of ‘person’. Indeed, from this
perspective the stage-theorist could maintain that the familiar 3D and 4D ac-
counts of personal identity get things the wrong way round. It is because per-
son stages are what they are that their processions give rise to the unity of con-
sciousness, not vice versa. Even if we endorse a radically conventionalist ac-
count of the counterpart relation needed to explain our ordinary talk and be-
liefs about temporal persistence, there is nothing inconsistent in the thought
that some stages are more tightly connected to one another than other stages.
There is no connection whatsoever between John Doe’s present temporal stage
and some past temporal stage of the table in front of me. But there are signifi-
cant connections (including spatial continuity and qualitative similarity) be-
tween John’s present temporal stage and his earlier stages. And it may well be
a matter of contingent fact that such connections lead to John’s present experi-
encing of a unity of consciousness.
One could protest that this account does not do justice to the fact that
people typically instantiate properties that cannot—by their very nature—be
instantiated by single, instantaneous stages. How can a person-stage be the
bearer of reasons, entertain thoughts and beliefs, perform actions, and so on?
Properties such as these require time and cannot therefore be satisfied by enti-
ties that do not persist.42 But this objection is wrong-headed. We have already
seen how the answer would go on a 4D account. And we have seen that the
stage-theorist need not disagree with the 4D-theorist on this: there is no claim
to the effect that all stages must exist in complete isolation from their temporal
counterparts, so again one could reply that a person-stage can satisfy the prop-
erties in question by virtue of its having the right intrinsic properties and
standing in the right relational ties to other stages and to its environment. The
objection presumes that mental states and properties are fully intrinsic, and
that is once again a sign of a 3D bias.
So much for the first part of the story, the mysteries of ex nihilo creation.
Concerning the second part—to the effect that the stage view is metaphysi-
41 See the Paralogisms in the first Critique.
42 See e.g. Brink 1997 for this line of objection.
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cally unpalatable insofar as it requires a crucial appeal to counterpart the-
ory—it obviously depends on what we think of counterpart theory in general.
Peter van Inwagen, for example, thinks the theory is bad and rejects the stage
view on that ground.43 I agree that one philosopher’s modus ponens may be
another philosopher’s modus tollens. But what exactly is the problem with
counterpart theory? In Section 1 I mentioned two main worries: that counter-
part theory violates the rigidity thesis, and that it has counterintuitive conse-
quences when it comes to first-person counterfactuals. The first worry has al-
ready been addressed, so it can now be set aside. What about the second? I
agree with Kripke that it sounds strange to say that John Doe’s speculations
about how he could have attained tenure are speculations about his modal
counterparts. And I agree with Perry (for example) that it sounds strange to
say that John’s present thoughts about the past and future events of his life are
not about him but about his temporal counterparts.44 But is this what counte r-
part theory forces us to say? Not quite. Modal counterpart theory says that it is
because of what happens to John’s counterparts that John can truthfully enter-
tain certain counterfactual thoughts about himself. That amounts to saying that
someone other than John enters into the story of how it is that he might have
attained tenure. But that doesn’t mean that John is out of the story. As Lewis
put it, thanks to his tenured counterparts John has the requisite modal property
to make it true that he himself might have attained tenure.45 So unless the
complaint is just that someone else gets into the act, the Kripkean objection
misfires. It is not that modal counterpart theory fails to acknowledge the work
of de re modal properties; it’s just that such properties are given a counterpart-
theoretic analysis. And if things are so, then a perfectly similar response could
be given to the analogous objection against temporal counterpart theory.
So what is the big deal? I think Ted Sider has it right when he says that
perhaps the big deal is, paradoxically, the extreme flexibility afforded by
counterpart theory.46 You can build anything you like into the counterpart r e-
lation. You can load it with immanent causation and make it do heavy meta-
physical work, or you can give it a cognitive bent and dismiss a host of phi-
losophical puzzles concerning identity as pertaining exclusively to our cogni-
tive and linguistic practices. Some may think that this is a negative feature of
the theory insofar as it makes life too easy. But I’d rather think that this is a
positive feature! One philosopher’s modus tollens is another philosopher’s
43 See van Inwagen 1990b, §III.
44 See Kripke 1972, p. 344, n. 13, and Perry 1972, p. 480.
45 See Lewis 1986, p. 196.
46 See Sider 2001, pp. 206–207.
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modus ponens, I say, especially if the alternatives involve problems of their
own. Particularly when it comes to issues of temporal persistence, it seems to
me that the flexibility of the counterpart relation corresponds very closely to
the sort of difficulty that philosophers and the folk alike have to face. We often
find ourselves wondering about whether such-and-such things will survive
such-and-such changes, and counterpart theory tells us that if we can’t come
up with a clear, univocal answer it is because our conception of the objects in
question does not rest on a clear characterization of the relevant relation of
temporal counterpart. This sounds just right to me. At least it sounds much
more plausible than any account that rests on mysterious essentialist discrimi-
nations.
So much for counterpart theory. As for the last aspect of the stage view
that might feel unpalatable—its extensive revisionary demands—I think the
right thing to say is just that every metaphysical theory calls for a good deal of
revisions. Surely we cannot hope to read off the furniture of the world directly
from our commonsensical thoughts about it, let alone the things that we feel
inclined to say about it. This is obviously true for ontology, as we know from
the old debates about the king of France and the round square. And I think it is
true for metaphysics at large. One obvious complaint one could raise against
the stage view is that it appears to make time-bound stages analytically prior to
the continuants of the folk view when, as a matter of fact, we cannot individu-
ate stages without making reference to continuants. This is a legitimate com-
plaint, familiar from Strawson’s work in descriptive metaphysics.47 But what
does it entail? Our inability to individuate certain things can hardly be infor-
mative when it comes to questions concerning the existence of those things. I
am rather good at individuating tables and persons but I am totally incapable
of individuating subatomic particles. Surely that does not entitle me to say that
such particles do not exist. Similarly, an obvious complaint against the stage
view is that it appears to make the stage-theoretic vocabulary analytically prior
to the vocabulary of the folk. But that is no reason to dismiss the thought that
the world might be made up of time-bound stages. Science tells us that tables
and persons are ultimately made up of subatomic particles, but that does not
mean that we have to translate language about tables and persons into the lan-
guage of subatomic particles. As long as we are clear about the truth-makers,
we can keep speaking with the vulgar. For, of course, the sort of revisionism at
issue has no hermeneutic pretense. It is genuine revisionism, the sort of revi-
sionism with which we have to deal whenever we try to answer questions
47 See especially Strawson 1959, ch. 1.
26
about what there is.48 It took me a while to accept the fact that cartoons are just
sequences of drawings, just as it took me a while to accept the fact that per-
sons, rocks, and tables are just swarms of molecules. It took me a while to ac-
cept the fact that the “wave” at the stadium—that “wave” that I can track and
name and talk about just as we track and name and talk about the characters of
a cartoon—is just a sequence of ups and downs. It may take a while to accept
the stage view, but that is hardly an argument against it.
7. Conclusion
I conclude that the metaphysical costs of the stage view are not as extraordi-
nary as they might at first seem. At least, they are not extraordinary in any
special way: the view has its drawbacks, but so do its competitors. Combined
with the advantages that the theory offers in relation to the other questions dis-
cussed in the paper, I take this to provide sufficient motivation for giving the
theory the theoretical status it deserves. Indeed, when all the arguments are in,
the advantages of the stage view outweigh its costs. I take this to provide good
evidence—the only sort of evidence that analytic philosophers can hope
for—in favor of the picture that it delivers.49
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